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Abstract
Infusing hierarchies with elements of market control has become a much-used way of
simultaneously increasing entrepreneurialism and motivation in firms. However, this paper
argues that such “internal hybrids,” particularly in their radical forms, are inherently hard to
successfully design and implement, because of fundamental credibility problems related to
managerial promises to not intervene in delegated decision-making  an incentive problem that
is often referred to as the “problem of selective intervention.”  This theoretical theme is
developed and illustrated, using the case of the world-leading Danish hearing aids producer,
Oticon.  In the beginning of the 1990s, Oticon became famous for its radical internal hybrid, the
”spaghetti organization.” Recent work has interpreted the spaghetti organization as a radical
attempt to foster dynamic capabilities by imposing loose coupling on the organization,
neglecting, however, that about a decade later, the spaghetti organization has given way to a
more traditional matrix organization. This paper presents an organizational economics
interpretation of organizational changes in Oticon, and argues that a strong liability of the
spaghetti organization was the above incentive problem.  Motivation in Oticon was strongly
harmed by selective intervention on the part of top-management  Changing the organizational
structure was one means of repairing these motivational problems. Refutable implications are
developed, both for the understanding of efficient design of internal hybrids, and for the more
general issue of the distinction between firms and markets, as well as the choice between internal
and external hybrids.
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Introduction
In academic research, as well as in managerial practice, the search for the sources of
competitive advantage has increasingly centered on organization-related factors (e.g. Barney
1986; Kogut and Zander 1992; Mosakowski 1998; Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1999).  Thus, many
firms, particularly those in “knowledge-intensive industries,” are argued to radically change the
way in which they structure their boundaries (e.g., Helper, MacDuffie and Sabel 2000) as well
as their internal organization (e.g., Miles et al. 1997). They so so in an attempt to become the
”information age organizations” (Mendelsson and Pillai 1999) that may foster those “dynamic
capabilities” (Teece, Pisano and Shuen 1997) that are necessary for competing in the emerging
knowledge economy (Halal and Taylor 1998). Fundamental advances in IT and measurement
technologies have facilitated these changes (Zenger and Hesterly 1997), while equally
fundamental developments in the organization and motives of capital markets as well as
increasing internalization are claimed to have made them necessary (Halal and Taylor 1998).
These experiments with economic organization are often referred to by notions such as “new
organizational forms” (Daft and Lewin 1993) and “the non-standard firm” (Helper, MacDuffie
and Sabel 2000), “cellular forms” (Miles et al. 1997).  From an organizational economics
perspective, they may be classified as either external hybrids (Williamson 1996), that is, market
exchanges infused with elements of hierarchical control, or internal hybrids (Zenger and
Hesterly 1997; Zenger 2002), that is, hierarchical forms infused with elements of market
control.  Empirical knowledge about the incidence and performance effects of many of these
organizational changes and forms is still rather scant.  However, there is growing evidence
related to the performance effects of the adoption of “high performance work practices”
(summarized in Capelli and Neumark 2001), such as employee involvement in teams, quality
circles and Total Quality Management initiatives, that is, practices that essentially belong to the
category of internal hybrids (Jensen and Wruck 1994; Zenger 2002).  There is also some
evidence that average firm size has been falling worldwide during the last two decades as firms
have engaged in downsizing, spin-off, outsourcing, and other exercises that result in either the
adoption of external hybrids (Zenger and Hesterly 1997) or the use of arms-length market
contracting. Cutting size, spinning off business units, etc. are often taken to be means to reduce
coordination costs, improve incentives, and help to clarify the nature of the businesses the firm
is in. Improvements in entrepreneurial capabilities as well as a better ability to produce, share
and re-produce knowledge often result (Grant 1996; Day and Wendler 1998; Mosakowski
1998).  However, note that these are exactly the reasons that are often given for the adoption of
internal hybrids (e.g., Miles et al. 1997).   Internal and external hybrids therefore seem to be
substitutes with respect to achieving these aims.
However, in practice they would appear to be rather imperfect substitutes.  Thus, adopting an
internal hybrid form has the benefit of involving fewer lay-offs relative to adopting external
hybrids (or engaging in arms-length contracting).  Moreover, spin-offs, carve-outs and the like
are often legally complex operations, whereas adopting an internal hybrid may be a matter of
fiat, and will therefore be an attractive alternative in terms of ink costs expended on corporate
lawyers.1 Further, management may fear that leaving too many activities in the hands of other
firms will hollow out the corporation (Teece et al. 1994), and related considerations of
protecting valuable knowledge may also be relevant (Liebeskind 1996).  Given all this, one may
wonder why firms should ever make governance choices in favor of external hybrids.
However, a main point of this paper is that internal hybrids are beset by distinct incentive costs
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 On the related idea that there are fundamental legal differences between organizing transactions inside the firm
versus organizing across markets, see Williamson (1996).
1that external hybrids (and markets) avoid.  These costs may tip the balance in favor of external
hybrids when firms confront the relevant governance choice.
Research on new organizational forms is clearly an emerging field (Daft and Lewin 1993;
Zenger and Hesterly 1997; Foss 2002).  Thus, little is known about the costs of new
organizational forms, whereas the benefits may have been more thoroughly examined.2 This is
particularly the case of those new organizational forms that belong to the category of internal
hybrids.3 The present paper mixes empirical observation with theoretical reasoning, mostly
drawn from organizational economics, in order to gain a better understanding of the
organizational design problems of internal hybrids. The theoretical emphasis is on the
(neglected) costs of internal hybrids, and in particular on commitment problems that derive
from delegation of decision rights in firms. The root of such problems is that in firms,
(delegated) decision rights are not owned; they are always loaned from the holder(s) of ultimate
decision-making rights, namely the top-management and/or the shareholders.  This means that
“markets” in hierarchies are always simulated ones; because of the differences in ownership,
they can never be real markets. Given this, a fundamental problem for top-management/owners
is to commit to real delegation and refrain from “selective intervention” (Williamson 1996),
which will harm motivation, and, hence, the incentives to invest in the accumulation of firm or
project-specific human capital.
These ideas are presented and discussed empirically with reference to organizational changes
that took place in the Danish electronics (primarily hearing aids) producer, Oticon A/S,
beginning in 1991. Oticon became world-famous for its radical delegation and empowerment
experiment.  The “spaghetti organization,” as it came to be known, was explicitly conceived of
by its designers as an attempt to bring elements of market control into Oticon to a very large
extent (Kolind 1990; Lyregaard 1993), emulating the superior incentive properties and the
dynamism of real markets.  The spaghetti organization was explicitly seen as a hard-to-replicate
source of knowledge-based competitive advantage (e.g., Gould 1994).  In fact, a recent cottage
industry has explicitly treated Oticon as an outstanding example of the sustained benefits that
radical project-based organization may provide (e.g., Lovas and Ghoshal 2000; Ravasi and
Verona 2000; Verona and Ravasi 1999).  This literature fails to note, however, that the Oticon
spaghetti organization in its initial radical form does not exist anymore  it has been
superceded by more structured administrative systems.  In the following, these organizational
changes will be discussed from an organizational economics starting point, placing primary
emphasis on problem of selective intervention.
The paper begins by developing an organizational economics interpretation of the spaghetti
organization (“The Spaghetti Organization: A Radical Internal Hybrid”). The spaghetti
organization appears to have been a particularly well-crafted internal hybrid; thus, it consisted
of complementary elements that were implemented rapidly and simultaneously. Still, it gave
way around 1996 to a more traditional matrix structure.  It is not plausible to ascribe this
organizational change to external contingencies, or to dramatic changes in strategic intent.  This
suggests that the spaghetti organization may have been beset by organizational costs that came
to dominate the benefit aspects, necessitating a change of administrative systems (“Spaghetti
and Beyond”).  The Oticon spaghetti experiment carries lessons for the design of internal
hybrids.  In particular, it directs attention to the incentive problems of delegating rights within a
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 Zenger (2002) argues that disproprotionately more work exists on external hybrids than on internal hybrids,
investigation of the latter being largely confined to work on the multi-divisional form. And Poppo (1995: 1845)
points out that ”[e]mpirical work that examines the differences between internal and external markets are rare…
Theory in this area is also limited.”
2firm when top-management keeps ultimate decision rights.  Refutable propositions for the
design of internal hybrids are derived  (“Discussion: Implications for Internal Hybrids”).
In sum the contributions of this paper are to 1) present a novel and in some respects more
encompassing account and interpretation of a well-known organizational change case,
exemplifying the interpretive usefulness of organizational economics in the process; 2) analyze
the (neglected) costs of internal hybrids in terms of the problem of selective intervention, thus
contributing to understanding the efficient design of such hybrids; and 3) argue that the analysis
under 2) is also helpful for understanding the broader issue of the fundamental differences
between firms and markets, including the choice between internal and external hybrids.
A Note on Method
Basic Method
A basic problem of undertaking research into the Oticon spaghetti experiment is that relatively
few of those who were employed when the experiment was implemented in 1991 are still with
Oticon, and the rest turned out to be very hard to locate.  Moreover, the experiment was
implemented a decade ago, and recollections of it are likely to be strongly influenced by
rationalizations and other biases.  Therefore, I decided to mainly rely on archival sources,
newspaper and magazine articles, and, in particular, the large number of very rich and thick
descriptions of Oticon that have been produced by a number of mainly Danish academics,
journalists and Oticon insiders throughout the 1990s (in particular, Lyregaard 1993; Poulsen
1993; Morsing 1995; Søndergaard and Døjbak 1997; Morsing and Eiberg 1998; Eskerod 1997,
1998; Jensen 1998).4
Thus, the approach followed with respect to understanding the nature of organizational changes
in Oticon was more that of the historian than that of the qualitative researcher trying to
understand recent phenomena or ongoing change.  In other words, the emphasis was more on
evaluating, comparing and integrating written statements relating to past key events (Van de
Ven 1992) than on performing the same operations on oral accounts relating to contemporary or
ongoing events.  This is a defensible research strategy, because the aim was not so much to
uncover hitherto unknown data relating to Oticon, as it was to develop a different interpretation
of already existing and very rich data, and discuss implications of this interpretation.5
However, the prime mover behind the spaghetti experiment, then-CEO, Lars Kolind, was
interviewed (June 2000) about a number of specific issues that were not adequately treated in
the existing material.  He also commented upon earlier drafts of this paper.  Also, the present
Oticon HRM officer was interviewed in a three hours, in-depth interview (June 2000).  The
interview mainly focused on the nature of recent changes in administrative systems in Oticon.
A subsequent follow-up was conducted to clarify details.  Interviews were semi-structured.
The Nature of the Inquiry
It is necessary to reiterate a methodological point already alluded to. The following represents
an attempt to pursue a specific kind of interpretation of a specific aspect of the Oticon spaghetti
organization  namely, an (primarily) organizational economics interpretation of the
organizational costs that this experiment imposed on Oticon , discuss why it was partially
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descriptive detail.
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  For similar research methodologies, see the studies in Temin (1991).
3abandoned, and use this as an input to developing propositions about internal hybrids.
Organizational economics per se is hardly in an early stage of theory development anymore,
given that early work goes back more than six decades (Coase 1937) and the last three decades
have witnessed a flurry of work in this field.  There is therefore little need for following a logic
of grounded theory per se (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Eisenhardt 1989). Moreover,
organizational economics is a particularly appropriate tool of interpretation in the present
context, because only this body of theory simultaneously frame internal hybrids theoretically,
cast the analysis in the relevant comparative-institutional terms (e.g., allows to compare
external and internal hybrids), and frame the kind of incentive problems that will be central in
the following analysis. For example, information processing or motivation theory cannot
accomplish all this.
However, a main purpose of conducting analysis of single cases often is to be able to pose
competing explanations for the same set of events (and perhaps to indicate how these
explanations may be applied to other situations) (Yin 1989).  Allison (1971) is the classic
exemplar here.  Moreover, basic considerations of internal validity dictate that alternative
explanations be considered.6  However, while I shall indeed make reference to and discuss other
possible explanations of some of the relevant events (e.g., ideas from motivation theory and
information processing theory), the main emphasis is on developing one specific interpretation.
While an eclectic, multiple perspective approach may be superior in the abstract, more insight
may arguably be provided in the concrete by pursuing, in a relatively narrow fashion, one
specific interpretation and explore the limits of this interpretation.7  With respect to those limits,
a suggestion to be made later is that the Oticon case suggests that organizational economics
may need to develop a richer understanding of motivation (cf. also Osterloh and Frey 2000) and
cognition (Foss 2001).
The Spaghetti Organization: A Radical Internal Hybrid
This section analyzes the Oticon spaghetti experiment as an internal hybrid, that is, an attempt
to infuse hierarchies with elements of market control, and develops an organizational
economics interpretation of this particular internal hybrid.  Recent work has utilized the Oticon
Spaghetti experiment for the purpose of developing notions of strategy making as “guided
evolution” (Lovas and Ghoshal 2000), as well as to discuss how the deliberate introduction of
“structural ambiguity” through the choice of loosely coupled administrative systems (Ravasi
and Verona 2000) may help to build “organizational capabilities for continuous innovation”
(Verona and Ravasi 1999).  This literature places all of the emphasis on the benefit side (mostly
innovation performance) of the spaghetti experiment and fails to note that the spaghetti
structure has been largely abandoned, and therefore also fails to account for the possible
reasons for this organizational change. In contrast, this paper accounts for the costs of this
particular internal hybrid and argues that this assists understanding the change from the
spaghetti organization. In order to develop this alternative account, the present section puts
forward an organizational economics interpretation of the spaghetti organization.
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 In addition, an adequate multi-perspective account of the spaghetti experiment would require at least a book-
length study.
4Oticon: Background
Founded in 1904 and based mainly in Denmark, Oticon (now William Demant Holding A/S) is
a world leader in the hearing aids industry.8  For a number of years in the beginning to the mid-
1990s, Oticon became a famous and admired instance of a  radical change.  According to the
main organizational designer, CEO Lars Kolind (1990, 1994) the aim of the Oticon turnaround
was to reach what he explicitly saw as a set of complementary goals (Mandag Morgen 1991:
17), namely increasing employee empowerment and responsibility, reducing product
development cycles, increasing contact to customers, mobilizing dispersed and “hidden”
existing knowledge, and building new knowledge  all contributing to the explicitly stated
strategic intent of achieving (once again) world dominance on the market for hearing aids.
Kolind and his new organizational design became favorites of the press, consultants, and
academics alike.9  In retrospect the reasons for this are the following ones.
First, the spaghetti organization embodied a large number of those non-traditional management
practices that were gaining currency at the time.  It was seen, and cleverly marketed, as the very
embodiment of loose coupling, project- and team-based organization, and empowerment driven
to their extremes.10 Second, the turnaround in Oticon was remarkable for taking place very
quickly and for involving changes in a large number of organizational elements. It
demonstrated that organizational change did not have to take place in a piecemeal, incremental
fashion to be effective.  Third, the spaghetti organization quickly delivered (Peters 1992;
Poulsen 1993). Thus, it demonstrated its innovative potential by re-vitalizing important, but
“forgotten” development projects, that, when implemented in the production of new hearing
aids, produced significant financial results, essentially saving the firm from a threatening
bankruptcy, as well as by turning out a number of new strong products.  The background to the
implementation of the spaghetti organization was the loss of competitive advantage that Oticon
increasingly realized during the 1980s.
From being the world leader at a 15 % market share in 1979 and with subsidiaries in West
Germany, Great Britain, The Netherlands, the United States, Norway, Switzerland, France, and
Italy, Oticon lost that position in less than a decade.  By the end of 1987, market share had
fallen to 7 %.  The results were massive financial problems.  One rather direct cause of a
continued fall in market share in the last years of the 1980s was the introduction in 1987 by the
US firm, Starkey of a new hearing aid that was considerably more sophisticated than any
existing Oticon product.  More generally, the technological paradigm (Dosi 1982) in the
hearing aids industry was gradually changing through the 1980s from “behind-the-ear” hearing
aids to “in-the-ear” hearing aids (Lotz 1998).  The capabilities on which Oticon’s success in the
1970s was founded were miniaturization capabilities.  While these had been critical for
competitive advantage in the “behind-the-ear” hearing aid paradigm, new technological
capabilities in electronics, which were not under in-house control by Oticon, were becoming
crucially important in the emerging in-the-ear paradigm. In particular, digital signaling
processing was appearing as an increasingly important technology that would drastically
transform productive processes in the industry.  At the end of the 1980s, Oticon management
had to realize that the competition had leapfrogged Oticon in terms of technological
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out as an extreme case.
5developments and in terms of reducing product development time.  However, realizing this took
time and was painful; acting on it was apparently even more painful.
There is considerable evidence (e.g., Poulsen 1993; Gould 1994; Morsing 1995; Foss and Hertz
2000) that Oticon was locked into a competence trap that was reinforced by strong groupthink
(Janis 1983) characterizing both the management team and the employees.  A symptom of this
was that around 1980, the dominant opinion among managers and development personnel at
Oticon was that the in-the-ear hearing aid would turn out to be a commercial fiasco.  Besides,
in-the-ear hearing aids were not perceived to be Oticon turf, in terms of both technological and
marketing capabilities (Poulsen 1993).  The self-image of the company clearly was one of being
a traditional industrial company with its strongest technological capabilities in miniaturization
and specialized in mass-producing behind-the-ear hearing aids, developing the underlying
technology incrementally.  The dominant ethos in the company was one defined by engineering
people, not by marketing people; technology, not customers, was central.  Administrative
systems were organized traditionally with functional departments, the managers of which
together constituted the senior executive group.  When problems began to accumulate, various
attempts were made to change the situation; however, they were either too insignificant and
incremental or did not survive political jockeying inside Oticon. The same executive team had
been in control of Oticon for just about thirty years. As a consequence of the mounting
difficulties, Oticon’s Foundation Board decided that new management was needed to handle the
crisis.  In 1988 Lars Kolind assumed his position as new CEO. Holding degrees in mathematics
and management, an important part of his background was the international scout movement.11
Upon assuming his new job, Kolind basically concentrated all decision-making in his own
hands; for example, virtually all expenses, even trivial ones, had to be approved of by him.  He
used this centralization of power to cut costs dramatically, for example, through extensive
layoffs. However, in a paradoxical way, he combined almost dictatorial concentration of power
with a great openness and with great communicative skills.  For example, the rather drastic
cost-cutting measures were very openly communicated, and their necessity carefully explained.
About a year after assuming his position, Kolind realized that the cost-cutting measures, which
had almost immediately improved the company’s financial situation, had been fully exploited.
Although these measures were arguably necessary ones, and did yield immediate and
substantial financial results, they could not secure longer-run competitive advantage.  In
particular, they were inadequate to cope with the decisive changes that were underway with
respect to products and processes in the industry and which were prompted by changing
preferences on the part of customers towards more advanced and aesthetically pleasing designs
as well as changing technology (i.e., the application of digital signal processing technologies).
More radical measures were needed with respect to the strategic orientation of the firm, the
administrative systems that could back this up, and the technology that the firm sourced,
leveraged and developed.
Trying Spaghetti
The new, radical measures were first sketched in a 6 pages memo, presented to Oticon
employees on April 18, 1990 under the heading, “Think the Unthinkable” (Kolind 1990).  The
objective of the plan sketched in the memo was to create an increase in profitability by 30%
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 It is perhaps significant that Kolind had been particularly impressed by the ability of that movement to organize
and coordinate large-scale gatherings (e.g., international jamborees) in an efficient, flexible and rapid manner, not
as a result of detailed planning and management, but rather as an emergent result of a strong and shared set of
values that served to orchestrate and coordinate decentralized initiatives. One may speculate that Kolind’s
reorganization of Oticon may be interpreted as an attempt to mimic the coordination capabilities of the scout
movement.
6over the next three years.  This required a change of corporate vision and mission: The
company should be defined broadly as a first-class service firm with products developed and
fitted individually for customers, rather than narrowly, as a manufacturing company producing
traditional high-quality standard behind-the-ear hearing aids.  In other words, customer
orientation should be key.  These strategic changes would be supported by a new organizational
form, representing a complete overhaul of the Oticon organization. Kolind baptized the new
organization the “spaghetti organization,” in order to emphasize the point that the new
organization should be able to change rapidly, yet still possess coherence.  Furthermore, it
should be explicitly “knowledge-based,” that is, consisting of “… knowledge centres …
connected by a multitude of links in a non-hierarchical structure” (Kolind 1994: 28-9).  Making
the organization “anthropocentric,” that is, designing jobs so that these would “… fit the
individual person’s capabilities and needs” (ibid.: 31), was argued to provide an important part
of the motivational underpinning of this knowledge network.  Furthermore, basing the network
on  “free market forces” (Lyregaard 1993) would make it capable of actually combining and re-
combining skills in a flexible manner, where skills and other resources would move to those
(new) uses where they were most highly valued.  Clearly, the aim was to construct a
spontaneously working internal network that would work with only minimal intervention on the
part of Kolind and other managers, that is, “essentially, a free market at work” (LaBarre 1996).
The new administrative structure was primarily implemented in the Oticon headquarters (i.e.,
administration, research and development and marketing), although various aspects of the
spaghetti-organization were also implemented in the production plant in Thisted (DK) and in
various sales offices outside of Denmark.12 In order to symbolically underscore the fundamental
transformation of Oticon, the company headquarters moved, at 8 am on 8. August 1991, to a
completely new location in Hellerup just north of Copenhagen.  All of the furniture of the old
headquarters was sold.  In the new building, all desks were placed in huge, open office spaces.
Employees were not supposed to be permanently located at particular desks, but should move
flexibly from desk to desk, bringing only a trolley with necessary documents with them,
depending on which projects they working on.  Inside a huge glass tube, placed in the lobby of
the company headquarters, a steady stream of maculated paper fell down, emphasizing the
ambition to run the headquarters in a virtually paper-less, electronic way.  Finally, the number
of formal titles was drastically reduced, resulting in a two-layered structure with Kolind and ten
managers representing the managerial team and the remaining part of the organization being
organized into projects (Kolind 1994).
Thus, the new organization represented a breakdown of the old functional department-based
organization into an almost completely flat, project-based organization.  Departments gave way
to “competence centers” (e.g., in mechanical engineering, audiology, etc.) that broke with the
boundaries imposed by the old departments. Another notable break with the traditional division
of labor in organizations was the “multi-job” concept which had two key features: First, there
were no restrictions on the number of projects that employees could voluntarily join, and,
second, employees were actively encouraged (and in the beginning actually required) to
develop and include skills outside of their existing skill portfolio.13 The underlying notion was
that this would increase the likelihood that project teams would  consist of the right mix of
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7complementary skills and knowledge, because of the increase in the scope of the knowledge
controlled by each team member. Moreover, the multi-job conceot would ease knowledge
transfer, because of the increase in the overlap of knowledge domains that it would produce, as
employees familiarized themselves with other employees’ specialized fields.
These changes were accompanied by an extensive delegation of the rights to make decisions on
resource allocation. Notably, employees would basically themselves decide on which projects
they would join rather than being assigned to tasks and projects from the above.  All projects
were to be announced on an electronic bulletin board, and employees who would like to join a
project could sign in electronically.  Project managers were free to manage projects, as they
preferred, “management” being understood more in terms of playing the role of facilitator and
coordinator than that of a directing principal.  Wage negotiations were decentralized, so that the
project managers  that is, those managers who were supposed to possess the most intimate
knowledge of employee skills and efforts  received the right to negotiate salaries.  Finally,
although project teams were self-organizing and, in theory at least, basically left to mind their
own business once their projects were ratified, they were still to meet with a ”Project and
Product Committee” once every three months for ongoing project evaluation.
To meet the two, potentially conflicting, aims of making it possible for project teams to rapidly
and flexibly combine the right skills, and achieving some overall coherence among what would
under the new organization be rather independently taken decisions, the new organization was
founded on four fundamental ideas (Kolind 1994).  First, as already noted, the traditional
functional department structure was eliminated in favor of a project organization that went
considerably beyond the traditional matrix structure. The philosophy behind this was not only
to make it possible to flexibly combine complementary skills, but also to eliminate department-
specific group-think, a problem that had plagued the old organization.   While this, of course,
served to increase flexibility, the remaining measures were arguably more directed towards
achieving organizational coherence.  Thus, secondly, new information technology systems were
designed and implemented to make it possible to coordinate plans and actions in this
decentralized organization.  The aim was to create a firm-wide information flow, increasing
employee understanding of company activities, and making it easier for project teams to form.
Moreover, the information-dissemination policy also helped to break knowledge-monopolies
left over from the old organization, although this does not appear to have been an explicit aim.14
Everybody was supposed to have full access to the same information.  Third, in a move called
the “breakdown of the palace,” the traditional office was abandoned.  No one would have
private offices or fixed desks; instead, all employees were located in one large office.  At each
desk was a workstation that included a cellular phone and a computer with access to all
information on the Oticon network.  The employees’ physical locations changed according to
the projects they worked on. Coffee bars were strategically located around the building to
stimulate and encourage discussion, and a central spiral staircase that was wide enough to
permit chance encounters and dialogue, replaced the elevators in the building.  Finally, Kolind
worked hard to increase intrinsic motivation by developing a corporate value base that strongly
stressed responsibility, personal development, and freedom.15
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8These fundamental organizing principles were backed up by other measures.  For example, in
order to increase motivation Kolind introduced an employee stock program, in which shop floor
employees were invited to invest up to 6.000 Dkr (roughly 800 USD) and managers could
invest up to 50.000 Dkr (roughly 7.500 USD).  Although these investments may seem relatively
small, in Kolind’s view they were sufficiently large to significantly matter for the financial
affairs of individual employees; therefore, they would have beneficial incentive effects. More
than half of the employees made these investments.  Kolind invested 25 millions DKK (roughly
4 million USD) of his own funds in Oticon (Kolind interviewed in Børsens Nyhedsmagasin
1991).
The implementation of the spaghetti organization had quick and strong performance effects
(Peters 1992; Poulsen 1993).  Improved performance in terms of the use and production of
knowledge was almost immediate, resulting in a string of remarkable innovations during the
1990s (Verona and Ravasi 1999; Ravasi and Verona 2000).  Improved growth and financial
performance followed somewhat later (see Table 1).16
TABLE 1
Oticon Financial and Technological Performance
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Net
rev.
(mio.
Dkr)
423,8 449,6 455,4 476,5 538,8 661,3 750,3 940,2 1.087,3 1.413,4 1.613,1 1.884,3
Profit
mg.
(%)
1,6 8 3,7 1,8 5,8 13,1 17,9 12,4 12,8 13,8 15,4 17,9
RoE
(%)
-8,5 11,6 9,4 -1,5 7,2 37 37,9 25,9 24,3 30,6 35,7 53,8
Pro-
duct
inno-
vation
Multi-
Focus
Perso-
nic
Oticon
4 Kids
Noah Micro-
Focus
Digi-
Focus
Spin-
off
innova-
tions of
Digifo-
cus
Spin-
off
innova-
tions of
Digifo-
cus
Ergo
Swift
Digi-
Focus
II
Sources:
 Ravasi and Verona (2000), Annual Reports of Oticon A/S and William Demant
Holding A/S.
With respect to improvements in the use of knowledge, the spaghetti organization allowed
significant, shelved projects to be revitalized.  Thus, it was realized that Oticon actually already
had embarked upon development projects for in-the-ear hearing aids as far back as 1979.17
These projects were essential inputs into many of the product innovations that Oticon launched
during the 1990s. Another effect of the spaghetti organization was that product development
time was halved.  In 1993, half of Oticon’s sales stemmed from products introduced in 1993,
1992 and 1991. A total of 15 new products had been introduced since the implementation of the
new organization, whereas none had been introduced in the last years of the earlier
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 Oticon’s growth in the 1990s largely represented growth of market share, since the market for hearing aids was
rather flat in that decade.
17
 As one employee who had worked in product development in the old organization said: ”We had created a good
structure with five people – each with their own area of responsibility I was responsible for the ear plug. But at that
time the organization simply wasn’t functioning.  No-one really believed in it and there was no support” (Foss and
Hertz 2000).  Some of these projects seem to have continued as skunkworks.
9organization.  The two major innovations that are usually directly ascribed to the increase in
innovative capability that the spaghetti organization fostered are MultiFocus from 1991 and
DigiFocus from 1996.18 Both represented strong technological discontinuities, the former by
being the first hearing aid that adjusted tonal balance and amplification in a fully automatic
way, the latter by being the first fully digital hearing aid ever.  The technological trajectories
defined by these two major product innovations yielded a number of incremental products
through the 1990s.
A recurring theme in academic treatments of the Oticon spaghetti organization (Morsing 1995,
1998; Verona and Ravasi 1999; Ravasi and Verona 2000) is that an important reason for the
observed increase in Oticon’s innovativeness, and, in turn, improved financial performance,
was ultimately rooted in imposing a condition of loose coupling (Weick 1976) on that
organization. Thus, Ravasi and Verona (2000) argue that loose coupling was achieved by
introducing “structural ambiguity,” that is, deliberately engineering freedom and ambiguity in
the role system and in the authority structure (cf. also Vancil and Buddrus 1979) by means of
introducing a radical project-organization.  In turn, this condition facilitated the efficient and
speedy integration and production of knowledge, resulting in the observed improvement of
Oticon innovativeness in the 1990s.  This interpretation fails, however, to explain why the
spaghetti organization was gradually abandoned from about 1996 in favor of a more traditional
matrix organization, and it also fails to account for the possible costs of the spaghetti
organization. The following section presents an complementary interpretation, based mainly on
organizational economics, that casts a different light over the organizational changes in Oticon.
The Spaghetti Organization as an Internal Hybrid
A striking aspect of the spaghetti organization is the prevalence of the market metaphor in the
commentaries on the new form by both insiders and outsiders (Peters 1992; Lyregaard 1993;
LaBarre 1996).19  The spaghetti organization may indeed be interpreted as a radical internal
hybrid, because the organization was strongly infused with elements characteristic of market
exchange (see Table 2).
                                                
18
 Today, MultiFocus is described by Oticon insiders as the product that saved the company from the bankruptcy
that would have been threatening in the somewhat longer run. The device exceeded sales expectations by more
than 100 % (Gould 1994).
19
  Much recent management literature has suggested that firms in volatile elements need to emulate markets to the
largest possible extent  (e.g., Halal, Geranmayeh, and Pourdehnad 1993; Cowen and Parker 1997).
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TABLE 2
Market Organization and the Spaghetti Organization Simulation
Market Organization The Spaghetti Organization
Allocation by means of pricing. Transfer prices not used.
Legal independence between parties
(contract law).
Employment contracts (employment law).
Freedom of contract Approximated by delegating rights to suggest and
join projects.
High-powered incentives. Variable pay; initially based on objective input
and output measures.
Dispersed residual claimancy. Employee stock schemes.
Dispersed decision rights. Very widespread delegation of rights.
Dispersed ultimate decision rights
(dispersed formal authority).
Concentrated ultimate decision rights
(concentrated formal authority).
Resource allocation decentralized, and
strongly influenced by local
entrepreneurship.
Local entrepreneurship very strongly encouraged.
Projects approval easily obtained.
Strong autonomous adaptation properties. Secured through extensive delegation of decision
rights.
Thus, although Oticon did not include an attempt to directly price services in the spaghetti
organization and Oticon employees did not become legally independent suppliers of labor
services, in many other relevant dimensions Oticon was like market organization than a
traditional hierarchical firm. Employees (particularly project leaders) were given many and
quite far-reaching decision-making rights. Development projects could be initiated by, in
principle, any employee just like entrepreneurs in a market setting, although these projects had
to pass, not the market test, but the test of receiving approval from the Project and Product
Committee.  Project groups were self-organizing in much the same way that, for example,
partnerships are self-organizing.  The setting of salaries was decentralized to project leaders,
acting like independent entrepreneurs (Business Intelligence 1993).  Incentives became more
high-powered, as more performance pay was used and as the employee stock ownership
program was introduced, thus mimicking the superior incentive properties of the market.  Most
hierarchical levels were eliminated and formal titles done away with, etc., mimicking the non-
hierarchical nature of the market.  Thus, market organization was emulated in a number of
dimensions.
As a general matter, the attraction of infusing hierarchical forms with elements of market
control is that some of the basic advantages of the hierarchy, such as the superior ability to
perform coordinated adaptation to disturbances (Williamson 1996), build specialized social
capital (Kogut and Zander 1992; Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1999), and share knowledge (Osterloh
and Frey 2000), can be combined with the superior incentive properties of the market
(Williamson 1996) and its superior flexibility with respect to autonomous adaptation (Hayek
1945; Williamson 1996).  Kolind’s explicit aim was to build an administrative system that was
superior to any other conceivable system with respect to discovering, building and combining
knowledge. His reasoning was that the superior abilities of an organization to build knowledge-
sharing environments and foster a cooperative spirit would complement the flexibility and
creativity that market-like project organization would foster (Kolind 1994).
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The Structure of Rights in the Spaghetti Organization
Organizational economics suggests that understanding the costs and benefits of any
organizational form begins from understanding the structure of decision and income rights in
the relevant form (Fama and Jensen 1983; Jensen and Meckling 1992; Hart 1995; Williamson
1996; Barzel 1997; Baker et al. 1999, 2000; Holmström 1999).  This is because the structure of
rights determines incentives and therefore crucially influences decisions and the outcomes of
interacting decisions. Both the benefits and the costs of the spaghetti organization can be
comprehended through this lens.  The remaining part of this section concentrates on the benefit
side.
Centralized decision-making systems, particularly large ones, have well-known difficulties with
respect to mobilizing and efficiently utilizing important “sticky” knowledge (von Hippel 1994),
such as the precise characteristics of specific processes, employees, machines, or customer
preferences (Jensen and Wruck 1994). They therefore often also have difficulties combining
such knowledge into new products and processes (Laursen and Foss 2002).  As Hayek (1945)
explained, the main problem is that much of this knowledge is transitory, fleeting and/or tacit,
and therefore costly to articulate and transfer to a (corporate) center.20 Markets have advantages
relative to pure hierarchies with respect to utilizing such knowledge, particularly when it is not
required to utilize the relevant knowledge in conjunction with other knowledge sets (where a
hierarchy may have comparative advantages).21 Thus, markets economize on the costs of
transferring knowledge by allocating decision rights to those who possess the relevant
knowledge, rather than the other way around (Hayek 1945; Jensen and Meckling 1992).  Rights
will move towards the agents who put the highest valuation on the relevant rights.  Since these
agents are residual claimants, effective use will be made of the rights they acquire.  From this
perspective, internal hybrids are fundamentally attempts to mimic, inside the hierarchy, the
decentralization of decision and income rights that characterizes the market in an attempt to
improve the efficiency of processes of discovery, creating, and use of knowledge.
The implementation of the spaghetti organization may be understood through this lens, that is,
as a hybrid organizational design that aimed at improving the co-location of knowledge and
rights through extensive delegation, and backed this delegation of decision rights up by giving
employees more income rights.22 By giving project teams extensive decision rights, requiring
that ideas for projects be made public, and ensuring that project teams possessed the necessary
complementary skills for a particular marketing, research or development task, the spaghetti
organization stimulated a co-location of decision rights with knowledge. More high-powered
incentives were implemented in an attempt to make sure that efficient use was made of those
rights.  This improved the use of existing knowledge (cf. the revitalization of project that had
been shelved in the old organization) and eased the combination of knowledge in the production
of new knowledge.
                                                
20
 Group think exacerbate these problems, that is, make it even more costly to transfer knowledge to those who are
supposed to make decisions based on this knowledge (Janis 1983).  .
21
 For a full comparative analysis, see Nickerson and Zenger (2001).
22
 The possibility that external hybrids or market contracting may be alternatives to internal hybrids never seems to
have been considered in Oticon.  Thus, that incentives may be strengthened by relying on the real market (rather
than the simulated internal one) through spinning off functions and departments (Aron 1991) does not appear to
have been seen as a serious alternative to internal disaggregation.  The production of some ”discount” (i.e.,
inexpensive, low-tech) hearing aids were in fact spun-off (with Oticon maintaining financial control over the spin-
off), but this was clearly an exception to the rule, and the company remains strongly vertically integrated to this
day.
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However, Oticon’s use of “free market forces” (Lyregaard 1993) was fundamentally a
simulation, because the allocation of decision rights in that organization (as in any firm) was in
some crucial respects different from the allocation that characterizes market organization This
is manifest in two (related) ways, one having to do with how decision rights connected to
projects were allocated and one having to with the exercise of ultimate authority by Oticon
management.  Consider these in turn.
In contrast to markets, firms cannot concentrate to the same extent income rights (i.e., residual
claimancy) and decision rights in the same hands.  An agency problem results from this
separation.  Many of the elements of the spaghetti organization may be seen as responses to this
fundamental agency problem, most obviously the increased use of high-powered incentives.
Consider also the rights to allocate resources to a particular project.  These may be broken
down into groups of decision-making rights, namely rights to 1) initiate projects, 2) ratify
projects, 3) implement projects, and 4) monitor and evaluate projects (cf. Fama and Jensen
1983).  Decision-making processes in project-based firms rest on the allocation and exercise of
such rights.  Thus, how these rights are allocated and exercised has profound implications for
the efficiency with which decision-making processes take place and for the outcomes of these
processes.  For reasons of efficiency, firms usually do not concentrate these rights in the same
hands; rather initiation and implementation rights may be controlled by one person (or team)
while ratification and monitoring rights are controlled by other persons, usually hierarchical
superiors.23
This allocation of decision rights was characteristic of the spaghetti organization. Whereas
anybody could initiate a project, in the sense of sketching, making preliminary plans, doing the
required calculations, making contacts, etc., projects had to be evaluated by the Products and
Projects Committee that was staffed by Kolind, the development manager, the marketing
manager, and the support manager. The Committee either rejected or approved of the project.
The only formal criteria for getting a project accepted were that the relevant project relate to the
business areas of Oticon and yield a positive return over a three years period and with a
discount rate of 30 %.  Apparently, the Products and Projects Committee did not control the use
of corporate resources by means of controlling the budgets of individual projects at the project
ratification stage.  In particular, the use of human resources, the main category of inputs, across
projects was not monitored.  The rights to implement a project following approval included the
right to hire employees in open competition with other projects (Eskerod 1998).  Operating
projects would meet every third month with the Products and Projects Committee, or a
representative thereof, for project evaluation (i.e., monitoring).
The fact that the Project and Products Committee could veto a project ex ante suggests that it
was the real holder of power in Oticon.  Frequent intervention on the part of the Committee ex
post confirms this (Eskerod 1998). Thus, it became increasingly clear that the Committee could
at any time halt or close down projects or change their employee composition. This kind of
intervention took place very frequently.  The Project and Products Committee’s exercise of
their ultimate decision rights may be seen as simply reflecting the separation discussed above
between decision management (i.e., initiation, implementation and daily project management)
and decision control (i.e., project evaluation and monitoring).  Thus, it could reflect attempts to
curb moral hazard in project teams.   However, this does not seem to have been the case
(Eskerod 1997), and, besides, the increased use of high-powered incentives and more
widespread employee ownership were designed to remedy problems of moral hazard.
                                                
23
  Exceptions may occur when giving subordinates more extensive rights (e.g., a package of initiation, ratification
and implementation rights) strengthens employee incentives (see Aghion and Tirole 1997;  Baker, Gibbons and
Murphy 1999; and Foss and Foss 2002 for analyses of this).
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Moreover, note that the theoretical separation between decision management and decision
control does not logically imply the kind of ex post intervention that the Committee engaged in.
For example, one may imagine that the relevant rights be allocated so precisely and with so
much foresight that there are incentives to intervene ex post, as in the case of a very detailed
contract between two legally independent firms.  Everything may proceed smoothly.  However,
the way in which the Project and Products Committee exercised their ultimate decision rights is
more akin to renegotiating a contract, perhaps even to performing a “hold-up” (Williamson
1996).  Thus, implicit contracts between the Committee and projects were renegotiated as the
efforts of project teams became, in the eyes of the Committee, superfluous (e.g., because of new
technological developments), moved in unforeseen directions, or simply turned out to have
been founded on ill-conceived ideas.  In turn, this exercise of ultimate control rights caused
unforeseen incentive problems, as will be discussed later.
Organizational Complementarities
A interesting aspect of the spaghetti organization is that an explicit logic of complementarity
was present in the reasoning of its main designer. Observed Kolind: “It was not strictly
necessary to do all these things at the same time, but we opined that with a simultaneous
implementation of the changes [in organizational elements] … they would reinforce each other”
(in Mandag Morgen 1993: 17; my translation). Consistent with Kolind’s reasoning,
complementarities between elements of an organizational form exist when increasing the level
of one element increases the marginal return from increasing the level of all remaining elements
(Milgrom and Roberts 1990; Hemmer 1995; Zenger 2002). Loosely, when such
complementarities obtain,  the dynamics of organizational elements imply that they move
together.  Changing one element in an isolated way is likely to set in motion (possibly
unforeseen) processes of change in other elements, because the system will grope towards an
equilibrium where all elements have changed (Zenger 2002).  The process of groping may be
associated with serious inefficiencies. Therefore, organizational change initiatives should “get
the complementarities right.”
Apparently, the spaghetti organization got the complementarities exactly right.  On a
fundamental level, the change in the rights structure of Oticon was designed in such a way that
decision rights changed in a way that was complementary to the change in income rights;
specifically, widespread delegation of decision rights was accompanied by making incentives
more high-powered through  performance pay and employee ownership.  In turn, the change in
incentives was backed up by complementary changes in measurement systems.  Thus, a
performance evaluation system was implemented in which employee performance was
measured in 3-8 different dimensions (depending on the type of employee) and pay was made
dependent on these measures (Poulsen 1993).  Other initiatives may also seen to be
complementary to the increase in the delegation of rights in the spaghetti organization.  For
example, the open office landscape and the strategically placed coffee bars and staircases were
complementary to rights delegation in terms of utilizing and building knowledge, because they
helped foster the knowledge exchange that gave rise to new ideas for project teams.  With
respect to the moral hazard problem introduced by delegating rights, the new much more
information-rich environment was also complementary to this delegation, because it helped to
build reputational effects (cf. Eskerod 1997, 1998) and eased mutual monitoring among
employees, keeping agency problems at bay.  Kolind’s (1990) strong emphasis on building
culture in the new organization may be seen in a similar light: Influencing preferences through
the building of shared values became a more valuable activity in the spaghetti organization,
because its strong delegation of rights introduced both problems of coordinating numerous
rather independently made decisions (Miller 1992) and agency problems, problems that are
reduced as preferences become more homogeneous.
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The complementary nature of these organizational elements also explains the speed and
toughness with which Kolind managed the transition from the old organization.24 This is
because it is usually inefficient to change  systems of complementary elements in an
incremental manner; transition between such systems should normally be accomplished in a
”big bang” manner (cf. Dewatripont and Roland 1995).  In fact, Kolind favored a big bang
approach to organizational change, because he reasoned that this would more effectively break
old commitments, make life hard for those who had held power positions in the old
organization, and create new organizational expectations than a more incremental approach
(Poulsen 1993; Morsing 1995).
Spaghetti and Beyond
A Puzzle
In his account of the spaghetti organization, Gould (1994: 470) noted that “… Lars Kolind’s
vision was the right one for Oticon.  In any case, one thing was certain: there could be no
turning back.”  Kolind’s vision may have the right one for Oticon at the particular time in which
it was implemented.  However, beginning in 1996, a considerable “turning back” actually
begun: Oticon embarked upon a partial abandonment of the spaghetti organization and
gradually adopted a more traditional matrix structure.  This organizational change is puzzling
because the account of the spaghetti organization in the previous section suggests that Kolind
got it right with respect to organizational design, at least from an organizational economics
point of view.  The puzzle is aggravated by the fact that it does not appear plausible to ascribe
this organizational change to outside contingencies, such as new technological discontinuities,
changes in regulations and in the competition, or to dramatic changes in strategic intent; no
such changes happened.  The argument in the following is that just as organizational economics
provides an interpretation of hitherto neglected aspects of the spaghetti organization (i.e., the
allocation of rights, organizational complementarities), this body of theory is also helpful for
developing a plausible interpretation of the retreat from the spaghetti organization.  In contrast
to the preceding section, the present section focuses more on the costs of the spaghetti
organization.
Retreating From Spaghetti
The retreat from the radical spaghetti organization that Kolind had implemented in 1991 began
long before he resigned as CEO in 1998.  In 1996, Oticon headquarters was divided into three
“business teams,” called “Team Advanced,” “Team Technology,” and “Team High Volume.”
These serve as a new administrative layer relative to the original spaghetti organization, and
function as overall administrative units around projects.  Each business team is managed by two
team leaders, namely a technician and a person with marketing or human resource skills.  These
teams refer directly to Niels Jakobsen, the new CEO.  In addition to the business teams, a
“Competence Center” has been set up. This unit is in charge of all projects and their financing
and of an operational group that controls administration, IT, logistics, sales and exports.  The
Competence Center is led by the chief HRM manager, and comprises nine managers. It is one
of the successors to the now abandoned Project and Products Committee.  However, its style of
managing projects is very different. In particular, the utmost care is taken to avoid the kind of
intervention in already approved of projects that characterized the Products and Projects
Committee.  The team leaders and the head of the Competence Center comprise, together with
the CEO, the “Development Group,” which may be seen as a second successor to the Products
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 The change was assisted by the symbolic acts undertaken by Kolind, which helped to signal his commitment to
the change. For example, Kolind’s 26 million Dkr investment was such an act of commitment (Hermalin 1998).
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and Projects Committee of the original spaghetti organization. The Development Group, which
essentially is the senior executive group, is in charge of overall strategy making.
Most of the initiative with respect to starting new projects is taken by the Development Group,
although the need for employees to provide inputs in the form of new project ideas is still
stressed.   Many of the decision-making rights earlier held by project leaders have now been
concentrated in the hands of the Competence Center, or the managers of the business teams.
For example, project leaders’ rights to negotiate salaries have been constrained.  Project leaders
are appointed by the Competence Center, so that the right to be a project leader is not
something that one grabs, as under the spaghetti organization. Although the multi-job concept is
still present, the extreme forms which it took under the spaghetti organization are not.  The
electronic job bourse where anybody in the old spaghetti organization could advertise projects
and seek co-workers has been abandoned.
To sum up, recent changes of administrative systems at Oticon, beginning around 1996, and
after the major innovations of MultiFocus and DigiFocus, have amounted to a break with the
bottom-up approach that characterized the original spaghetti structure.  Much of the initiative
with respect to development efforts now comes from the Competence Center.  More
hierarchical layers have been introduced, the number of managers is considerably larger, and
many of the decision rights that were decentralized under the spaghetti organization have now
been concentrated in the Development Group and the Competence Center.  Thus, although
Oticon is still characterized by considerable decentralization and delegation of rights, many of
the crucial elements of the spaghetti organization have been left.   What happened?
Searching for Possible Causes of the Partial Failure of the Spaghetti Experiment
Although the spaghetti organization at first inspection seems to have been a particularly well
crafted internal hybrid, reflection suggests that it may still have been beset by problems,
stemming from design mistakes, which caused its partial abandonment about five years later.
In the following, a number of such possible problems are discussed. It is convenient to group
these into problems of allocating competence, eliminating tournaments, sacrificing
specialization advantages, coordination, knowledge sharing, and influence activities.25
Problems of Allocating Competence. Demsetz (1988) and Casson (1994) argue that firms are
hierarchical because this is an efficient way of utilizing different, yet complementary
knowledge.  Direction may be less costly than instruction or joint decision-making.  When this
is the case, those with more decisive knowledge should direct those with less decisive
knowledge.   Thus, the hierarchy is an efficient method of allocating competence.  The
spaghetti organization eliminated most hierarchical levels.  Thus, the extent to which hierarchy
could be used as a sorting mechanism for allocating skills was much smaller in the spaghetti
organization.  For example, the delegation of project initiation rights implied that competent
and less competent people had the same rights to initiate projects and get a hearing before the
Projects and Products Committee.  Knowledge-based inefficiencies may have resulted that may
have been avoided in a traditional hierarchy.
However, this explanation implicitly asserts that managers are, on average, more
knowledgeable with respect to what actions subordinate employees should optimally take than
these employees are themselves (Foss 2002).  If this is not the case, bottom up selection
                                                
25
  A further cause of the retreat from the spaghetti has to do with the fact Lars Kolind became increasingly
involved in managing acquired subsidiary companies, and had to increasingly delegate control over the
headquarters to other members of the management team.  Much of the ”glue” of the spaghetti organization may
have consisted in the unique communicative and leadership skills of Kolind.
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processes may sort better than hierarchical processes.  In fact, the spaghetti organization was (at
least in the official rhetoric) very much founded on the notion that bottom up processes would
select more efficiently than hierarchical processes. Hierarchical superiors may be more
knowledgeable about which actions should be optimally taken by subordinates is when there
are strong complementarities between the actions of subordinates, and hierarchical superiors
possess private information about these complementarities, and/or they possess private
information about which states of the world that have been realized. To be sure,
complementarities between subordinates’ actions and knowledge sets obtained in the spaghetti
organization.  However, the purpose of the spontaneous, market-like, bottom-up processes was
exactly to discover and utilize such complementarities  something that the earlier hierarchical
organization had not been capable of.  Thus, it seems unlikely that abolishing the hierarchy in
Oticon led to serious inefficiencies inefficiencies related to the allocation of competence.
Problems of Eliminating Tournaments. From an incentive perspective, the extremely flat
spaghetti organization implied that a particular incentive instrument was no longer available to
the organization: Hierarchical job ladders could not any longer function as incentive
mechanisms in their own rights, since the spaghetti organization essentially abolished what
agency theorists call “tournaments” between managers (Lazear 1995).  Promotion was no
longer a “prize” that could be obtained through expending effort.  However, while the spaghetti
organization may have eliminated this particular incentive instrument, it introduced a number of
new incentive instruments, such as performance payment based on a number of measures.
From the point of view of individual employees, these new instruments were probably stronger
than tournaments, because they were less open to political manipulation.  Thus, the sacrifice of
tournaments as an incentive instrument is not likely to have been a major problem.
Problems of Sacrificing Specialization Advantages. As mentioned earlier, a key ingredient of
the spaghetti organization was the multi-job concept which implied 1) that each employee was
encouraged to develop skills that were outside their present skill portfolios, and 2) was free to
join projects as they saw fit (dependent on the acceptance of the project leader).  Much work on
Oticon has treated the multi-job concept as a strong stimulus to knowledge exchange and
integration (e.g. Verona and Ravasi 1999; Ravasi and Verona 2000).   There is clearly much to
this argument.  However, there were also costs associated with this principle.  Most obviously,
the encouragement to develop skills outside the current skill portfolio may have sacrificed
specialization advantages.  However, there are indications that this was actually not the case.
Thus, an Oticon engineer may have been encouraged develop English writing skills
(Søndergaard and Døjbak 1997).  He would then be in a position to undertake technical
translation relevant to his project, and do so in a much more informed way than a professional
translator would.  Thus, rather than sacrificing specialization advantages, this aspect of the
multi-job concept may rather have exploited complementarities between different skills.
Problems of Coordination. However, there is strong evidence that the second part of the multi-
job concept, the freedom to join projects, had significant costs.26 Nobody kept track of the total
time that employees spent on projects.27 Moreover, project leaders were free to try to attract
those who worked on competing projects, and in many cases they succeeded in doing so.  This
was a consequence of the explicit aim to emulate the market, but the effect was that it was hard
to commit employees to projects and to ensure an efficient allocation of attention to projects
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 Eskerod (1997, 1998) in particular documents this.  My later interview with the chief HRM officer strongly
confirmed Eskerod’s finding that the multi-job concept had severe costs in terms of problems of coordination and
frustrating employees.
27
  And neither would this have been possible, as nobody in Oticon, not even the Projects and Product Committee,
kept track of the total number of development projects.  Records were only kept of the 10-20 major projects.  An
estimate is that under the spaghetti organization, an average of 70 projects were continously running (Eskerod
1998: 80).
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(Gifford 1992). This led to severe coordination problems, because project leaders had very little
guarantee that they could actually carry a project to its end, given that anybody at the project
could leave at will, if noticing a superior opportunity in the internal job market.  Moreover,
many employees joined more projects than their time resources possibly allowed for, creating
problems of coordinating schedules and work hours.  The Products and Projects Committee had
no routines for dealing with these problems, and apparently reputation mechanisms were not
sufficient for coping with them either.
It seems that these problems could have been have been reduced by simply prohibiting
employees from working on more than, say, two projects that could not add up to more than
100 % of the employee’s total work hours.28 Establishing such controls in the original spaghetti
organization would, however, have run against the official rhetoric of autonomy,
empowerment, and delegation. Alternatively, monitoring systems might have been refined to
control dimensions of employee behavior that related to their attention and work allocation
across the projects they participated, so as to reduce coordination problems. However, the very
elaborate monitoring system that was implemented together with the spaghetti organization and
involved the construction of objective measures on half a dozen aspects of employee behavior
(Poulsen 1993) appears to have been quickly and tacitly shelved and substituted with a simpler
system that relied much more on subjective performance assessment (Business Intelligence
1993).  This suggests that the problem with monitoring systems under the original spaghetti
organization rather was that they were already too complex and costly to administer in practice.
Problems of Knowledge Sharing. The vision behind the spaghetti organization was to build an
organizational form that was far superior to the earlier one (and to any other conceivable
system) in discovering, building and utilizing knowledge (Kolind 1996).  The multi-job concept
clearly promoted knowledge sharing and, in turn, knowledge creation.  However, there is
evidence (Eskerod 1996, 1998) that knowledge sharing was not always spontaneous and
uninhibited.  In fact, in some cases, knowledge tended to be held back within projects, because
of the widespread, and correct, perception that projects were essentially in competition over
corporate resources.  Thus, by stressing so strongly a market-like competitive ethos and by
making incentive systems more “high-powered” (Williamson 1996) than they had been under
the old organization, the spaghetti organization to some extent worked against its stated
purposes.  The organization’s measurement and reward systems apparently could not cope fully
with these problems.29
It is debatable how significant this problem was.  It may be argued that the impressive
innovation record of Oticon in the 1990s indicates that the firm’s creation of knowledge may
not have been significantly harmed by the competitive relations existing in the spaghetti
organization.  Still, the relevant question is whether the knowledge-sharing environment could
have been better designed. Knowledge sharing is not necessarily best stimulated by a kind of
project organization that simulates competitive markets.  To the extent that knowledge sharing
is a hard-to-measure performance variable, employees are likely to put less of an emphasis on
this (Holmström and Milgrom 1991). Upon realizing this, resort to lower-powered incentives is
likely (Holmström 1999).  This corresponds to what took place in Oticon, where it was realized
that the internal market produced not only benefits with respect to knowledge-integration, but
had certain harmful effects on knowledge-sharing.  Although the performance measurement
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 In fact, the more structured project organization gradually implemented from 1996 has established controls that
secure that the coordination and time-allocation problems that beset the original spaghetti organization are kept at
bay.
29
  Possibly as a reflection of these problems, the most important variable with respect to determining salary
changes in the present organization is the degree to which an employee contributes to knowledge-sharing.
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systems in Oticon now includes attempts to measure employees’ contribution to knowledge
sharing, it is also the case that the strong competitive ethos which characterized the spaghetti
organization has been significantly dampened in the successor form.
Problems Caused by Influence Activities.  Influence activities are those activities in which
subordinates may engage in the hope of influencing hierarchical superiors to make decisions
that are in one’s interest rather than in the organization’s (Milgrom 1988; Schaefer 1998;
Argyres and Mui 2000). Resources expended on influence activities are, from the point of view
of the organization, waste. It is arguable that it is relatively more difficult under an organization
such as the spaghetti organization to protect against influence activities. This is because
everybody has, in principle, direct access to the management team. A comparative advantage of
the traditional, hierarchical and rule-governed organization is exactly that it may be better at
protecting itself against influence activities, because access to those who hold ultimate decision
rights is more difficult.  Moreover, what each employee is allowed to do and perhaps say
(Argyres and Mui 2000) in a more traditional organization is likely to be more narrowly
circumscribed than in a loose-coupled organization such as the Oticon spaghetti organization
(Milgrom 1988).30
In fact, the spaghetti organization which actively stimulated competition between project
groups for the approval of the only relevant “hierarchical superior” left, namely the Projects and
Products Committee, clearly produced such influence activities. In contrast, under the
hierarchical form existing prior to the spaghetti organization, such activities had been much less
prevalent, because of the aloof management style of the old management (Poulsen 1993).
Personal relations to those who staffed the Committee became paramount for having a project
ratified by the Committee. As Eskerod (1998: 80) observed:
Part of being a project group may be lobbying in the PPC trying to obtain a high
priority status by influencing the PPC members.  The reason for doing this is that a
high priority project is regarded as a very attractive place for the employees,
because the management sees this project as important.
It is, however, not clear from the existing empirical studies of the spaghetti organization that
this was perceived of as a serious problem in the organization, for example, whether it resulted
in obviously unimportant projects being approved of by the Committee.  Rather, it was taken as
an unavoidable, and relatively small, cost of the spaghetti organization.31
To sum up, the search for the causes of the partial abandonment of the spaghetti organization so
far seems to lead to only inefficiencies stemming from the lack of well functioning project
management routines on the part of Products and Projects Committee being a really serious
problem. However, as mentioned, this problem could have been dealt with by adopting better
project management routines; handling it did not necessarily require a major organizational
change.  Still, the many possible small liabilities of the spaghetti organization (some problems
of knowledge being held back in projects, some influence activities, etc.) may together have
added up to significant costs that could be reduced by adopting a more structured organizational
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 This is not to say that ”non-traditional” organizational forms are necessarily beset with influence costs.  See
Argyres and Mui (2000) for an excellent analysis of how organizations may commit to certain rules that regulate
what is acceptable discourse.  Those rules reflect a trade-off between the benefits of organizational learning
stimulated by dissenting opinion and the costs of rent-seeking activities that are pursued in the organizational
conversation.
31
  Interview with HRM manager Henrik Holck.
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form (Børsens Nyhedsmagasin 1999; interview with Henrik Holck June 2000).   Moreover,
there is one fundamental incentive problem left that was clearly present in the spaghetti
organization, and which is the strongest candidate for the decisive cause of the partial
abandonment of that organizational form.
The Problem of Selective Intervention
Although infusing hierarchical forms with elements of market control seems attractive, crafting
and implementing such internal hybrids is a highly complicated problem.  One reason is a
fundamental incentive problem that plagues all hierarchies, but is arguably particularly
prevalent in the kind of  very flat organizations of which the Oticon spaghetti organization is an
example. An early statement of the nature of this problem can be found in the comparative
systems literature in economics, that is, the literature taken up with the economic differences
between capitalist and socialist systems.  Thus, Mises (1949: 709) argued that there are
fundamental problems involved in ”playing market” inside hierarchies.32 Specifically, he
argued that schemes for designing a socialist market economy would not work. Importantly, the
concentration of ultimate decision-making rights and responsibilities, and therefore ownership,
in the hands of a central planning board would dilute the incentives of managers.  Thus, while
planning authorities could (and according to those schemes , should) delegate rights to make
production and investment decisions to managers, these rights were likely to be used
inefficiently.  First, because managers could always be overruled by the planning authorities,
they were not likely to take a long view, notably in their investment decisions.  Second, because
managers were not the ultimate owners, they were not the full residual claimants of their
decisions and, hence, would not make efficient decisions.
Later research has clarified that 1) handling the problem requires that the planning authorities
can credibly commit to a non-interference policy, and 2) the problem is much more general than
the comparative systems context.  It is latent (or manifest) in all relations between “rulers” and
“ruled” (North 1990; Miller 1992; Miller and Hammond 1994; Williamson 1996).  The ancient
problem of “constraining the kind” is an instance of it (Miller and Hammond 1994).  The
problem arises from the fact that it is hard for the ruler to commit to a non-interference policy,
because reneging on a promise to delegate will in many cases be extremely tempting and those
to whom rights are delegated will anticipate this. Loss of motivation results. These kinds of
problem are far from  unknown in organizational studies, (e.g., Vancil and Buddrus 1979: 65).
Thus, transaction cost economist, Oliver Williamson (1996) has coined the concept of the
”impossibility of elective intervention.”  He describes it as:
… a variant on the theme, “Why aren’t more degrees of freedom always better than
less?.” In the context of firm and market organization, the puzzle is, “Why can’t a
large firm do everything that a collection of small firms can and more.” By merely
replicating the market the firm can do no worse than the market.  And if the firm can
intervene selectively (namely, intervene always but only when expected net gains
can be projected), then the firm will sometimes do better.  Taken together, the firm
will do at least as well as, and will sometimes do better than, the market (1996:150).
Williamson directly argues that (efficient) selective intervention of this kind is ”impossible.”
Incentives are diluted, because the option to intervene ”… can be exercised both for good cause
(to support expected net gains) and for bad (to support the subgoals of the intervenor)”
(Williamson 1996: 150-151).  Promises to only intervene for good cause can never be credible,
Williamson argues, because they are not enforceable in a court of law.
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 Somewhat later, the literature on internal transfer prices revealed the existence of various incentive problems
that may beset this organizational practice (Eccles 1986; Holmström and Tirole 1991).
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The wider implications of Williamson’s reasoning, although they are not explicitly stated in his
work, are that since decision rights cannot be delegated in a court-enforceable manner inside
firms, and therefore are not contractible, authority can only reside at the top. Authority cannot
be delegated, even informally, since any attempt to do this will run into the problem of the
impossibility of selective intervention. One would therefore expect to see little use of
delegation.  Given that delegation is clearly a viable and widespread organizational practice,
this suggests that Williamson’s argument that selective intervention is strictly impossible goes
too far.
In fact, it is conceivable that the intervenor may credibly commit to not intervene in such a way
that the ”subgoals of the intervenor” are promoted.  The logic may be stated in the following
way (cf. Baker, Gibbons and Murphy 1999).  Assume that a subordinate initiates a project.33
Assume further that the manager has information that is necessary to perform an assessment of
the project, but that he decides upfront to ratify any project that the subordinate proposes.
Effectively, this amounts to full informal delegation of the rights to initiate and ratify projects
 ”informal,” because the formal right to ratify is still in the hands of the manager and because
that right cannot be allocated to the subordinate through a court-enforceable contract (cf.
Williamson 1996).  Because the subordinate values being given freedom  he is partly a
residual claimant on the outcomes of his activities  this will induce more effort in searching
for new projects (Aghion and Tirole 1997; Foss and Foss 2002).  To the organization, the
expected benefits of these increased efforts may be larger than the expected costs from the bad
projects that the manager has to ratify.
However, a problem arises when the manager has information about the state of a project
(”bad” or ”good”).  He may then be tempted to renege on a promise to delegate decision
authority, that is, intervene in a “selective” manner.  If he overrules the subordinate, the latter
will lose trust in him, holding back on effort. Clearly, in such a game a number of equilibria,
each one characterized by different combinations of employee trust and managerial
intervention, are feasible. What determines the particular equilibrium that will emerge is the
discount rate of the manager, the specific trigger strategy followed by the sub-ordinate (e.g.,
will he lose trust in the manager for all future periods if he is overruled, or will he be more
forbearing?), and how much the manager values his reputation for not reneging relative to the
benefits of reneging on a bad project (Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy 1999).
So far, the approach followed builds on standard economic rationality assumptions and on
managers and employees being only extrinsically motivated (cf. Frey 1997).  Extending it by
introducing richer motivational and cognitive concerns that go beyond standard economic
assumptions aggravates the problem of selective intervention.  In the economics approach
sketched above, the employee is motivated solely by being able to share in the outcomes of his
activities; managerial intervention decreases motivation because it means that the expected gain
of putting effort into the project diminishes. However, as argued in an extensive literature in
psychology (summarized in Frey 1997), people are also likely to be intrinsically motivated.
Such motivation may be sustained by psychological contracts that involve loyalties and
emotional ties (Brockner et al. 1992; Robinson and Morrison 1995; Osterloh and Frey 2000:
541).  Selective intervention, particularly when it is perceived to be essentially arbitrary, breaks
such contracts and harms intrinsic motivation (Robinson and Rousseau 1994).  Thus, even if
employees have no direct financial stake in the outcomes of their efforts, but are, for example,
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  This should be understood in a broad sense: A “project” may refer to many different types of decisions or
clusters of decisions.
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simply being paid a flat wage, their motivation is still likely to be harmed by selective
intervention.
Other parts of psychological research (summarized in Bazerman 1994) suggest other ways in
which the problem of selective intervention may be aggravated in practice.  Thus, robust
findings in experimental psychology show the presence of a systematic overconfidence bias in
judgment, that is, people tend to trust their own judgments more than is “objectively”
warranted.  Managers are not likely to be exceptions to this bias, perhaps quite the contrary.
The presence of the overconfidence bias in the judgments that underlie managerial decision-
making is likely to lead to aggravate the problem of selective intervention, because it produces
additional meddling in subordinates’ decisions (Nickerson and Zenger 2001: 15). Although the
problem of selective intervention may be cast entirely in standard economic terms, a full
theoretical and managerially relevant understanding of the problem must draw upon these
psychological findings.
Selective Intervention in Oticon
It is arguable that a the main reason why the spaghetti organization was changed into a more
hierarchical, organization has to do with the sort of incentive and motivational problems
described above.  The official rhetoric, stressing bottom-up processes in flexible, market-like
and essentially self-organizing system, with substantial autonomy and a management team (i.e.,
the Projects and Products Committee) that acted as little more than facilitator (Kolind 1990;
Lyregaard 1993), became increasingly at odds with the frequent selective intervention that was
undertaken by the Projects and Products Committee.  The need for selective intervention was
rationalized by an external observer in the following terms:
…PPC [the Products and Projects Committee] does not make general written
plans, which are accessible to the rest of the organization … if this were done,
plans would have to be adjusted or remade in an ever-continuing process, because
the old plans had become outdated  (Eskerod 1998: 80).
In other words, instead of drafting and continuously revise plans under the impact of changing
contingencies, the Products and Projects Committee preferred to intervene directly in projects.
In fact, this was taken by the Products and Projects Committee to be an unavoidable feature of a
flexible, project-oriented organization   (Eskerod 1998: 89). However, this approach was a
direct signal to employees that the “contract” between any project and the Products and Projects
Committee was very incomplete (Williamson 1996), and that the Committee might at any time
exercise its ultimate control rights for the purpose of intervening in projects.  This led to diluted
incentives and strongly harmed motivation (as documented at length by Eskerod 1997, 1998).
Thus, the frequent intervention and changing priorities of Kolind and the Products and Projects
Committee caused mounting frustration among employees. Accumulating frustration finally
resulted in a major meeting in 1995, announced as the “Take shots at top management!”
meeting.  This meeting marks the beginning of the retreat from the pure spaghetti organization.
On the meeting employees dramatically expressed their concerns about the contrast between, on
the one hand, the Oticon value base, including the strong rhetoric of delegation, and, on the
other hand, the way in which the company was actually managed.  Frustration that projects
were interrupted in seemingly arbitrary ways and that the organization was far better at
generating projects than at completing them was openly voiced.
The preceding discussion suggests that a fundamental organizational problem in the spaghetti
organization was that Kolind and the Products and Projects Committee never committed to a
policy of not intervening selectively; neither, apparently, did they intend to do so, or even see
any sensible rationale in it.  Kolind’s view appears to have been that in important respects and
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in many situations, he and the Products and Projects Committee would possess accurate
knowledge about the true commercial and technical possibilities of a given project, and that
efficient utilization of corporate resources dictated intervening in, and sometimes closing down,
projects.  However, that view clashed on a basic level with the rhetoric of widespread
delegation of decision rights, leading to the demise of the radical spaghetti organization, and the
adoption of the present more structured matrix organization.
In principle, Kolind and the Products and Projects Committee could have committed to a policy
of non-interference from the beginning, rather than acting on the belief that organizational
flexibility required that they selectively intervene in projects.  Conceivably, this might have
made this radical internal hybrid viable.  However, even if Kolind and the Products and Projects
Committee had announced initially that they would refrain from selective intervention, there are
reasons why this commitment may not have sustainable in the longer run.   Thus, it was
increasingly realized that the elaborate system of measures that was initially installed was
inadequate.  It did not capture important dimensions of behavior (e.g., employees’ contribution
to knowledge sharing) and it may have contributed to some projects holding back knowledge.
Rather than trying to refine the system further, it was abandoned.34 However, the implication
was that management could no longer take place solely through incentives (following initial
ratification of projects).  The employee stock ownership program was arguably not sufficiently
high-powered to truly motivate, and did not confer sufficient decision rights to halt the practice
of selective intervention to employees.  The implication was that Kolind and the Products and
Projects Committee had to engage in much more monitoring of the projects. Doing this without
compromising team autonomy and harming motivation was unlikely.
The New Organization
The present Oticon organization is characterized by a much more consistent approach towards
projects on the part of the Competence Center (one of the descendants of the Products and
Projects Committee).  Organizational expectations appear to be that priorities do not change in
the rapid and erratic manner that characterized the original spaghetti organization, and that
employees can be much more sure that the projects they are working on are taken all the way to
the end.   In the new organization, projects are rarely stopped or abandoned, and there is an
explicitly stated policy of sticking to ratified projects.  Two reasons are given for this.  First,
projects now rest on generally more secure ground, having been more carefully examined
beforehand.  An aspect of this is that the Competence Center now much more actively puts
forward projects ideas and contacts potential project leaders, rather than relying on the bottom-
up approach that characterized the original spaghetti organization.  Thus, hierarchical selection
has to some extent substituted for selection performed by bottom-up processes. Second, the
wish to avoid harming motivation (i.e., diluting incentives) by overruling going projects is
strongly stressed.  Apparently, present Oticon management has realized the need to credibly
commit to a policy of non-interference with going projects.  The Competence Center has
announced this policy, and has made it credible by 1) sticking to it and 2) researching project
ideas carefully ex ante so that employees’ perceived probability that intervention will occur is
low.  Some reasons why a more traditional hierarchy may be better at making such commitment
credible is discussed in the following section.
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 Since behavior was apparently difficult to measure, a more output-based system could have been tried
(Prendergast 1999), for example, contracts that specified rewards for specific accomplishments (e.g., a system that
rewarded according to milestones in a development project).  However, it is doubtful whether such a contract could
actually be made court-enforceable. A managerial commitment problem would again be the result.
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Discussion: Implications for Internal Hybrids
Proponents of internal hybrids argue that their main advantages lie in the ability to integrate the
virtues of more conventional organizational forms, and that such an integration may be
paramount under knowledge-intensive, hyper-competitive conditions (Miles et al. 1997).
Specifically, internal hybrids combine the ability to achieve efficiencies through specialization
that characterizes the functional form with the relative independence that can be granted in an
divisional form and the ability to transfer resources and capabilities across division and
business unit boundaries that characterize the matrix organization (e.g., Miles and Snow 1992).
Strikingly similar arguments were invoked by the designers of the Oticon spaghetti organization
(Kolind 1990, 1994; Lyregaard 1993). This suggests that something may be learned from the
Oticon experience about the design and viability of internal hybrids.  This section derives a
number of refutable implications from the discussion.  It also relates to a complementary
explanation of the Oticon spaghetti experiment, and it touches upon some broad implications
for economic organization, particularly the distinction between firms and markets.
Getting the Complementarities Right
A basic proposition in much of organization theory is that for reasons of efficiency
organizational forms are aligned with environmental conditions, strategies and exchange
conditions in a systematic and discriminating manner (Thompson 1967; Meyer, Tsui and
Hinings 1993; Williamson 1996; Nickerson and Zenger 2000).35 Thus, Zenger (2002: 4) argues
that many attempts to infuse hierarchies with elements of market control break with this basic
proposition and often  ”… violate patterns of complementarity that support traditional hierarchy
as an organizational form.” Discrete governance structures that consist of consistent elements
result.  For example, managers implement new structures without new performance measures
and new pay systems, or they implement new pay systems without developing new
performance measures (also Baron and Kreps 1999).  Such attempts results in unstable, and
possibly inefficient, hybrid forms. The conclusion is the Williamsonian one (Williamson 1996)
that just as markets and firms as governance structures are characterized by organizational
elements clustering in certain characteristic, complementary combinations, so are (internal)
hybrids.
Did the spaghetti organization get the complementarities right? On first inspection, it did, as has
been argued.  However, closer inspection reveals that this may not have been the case, after all.
Thus, it may be argued that Oticon did not get the organizational complementarities exactly
right, because the kind of very radical internal hybrid that was adopted in actuality required that
projects be managed almost exclusively through the provision of incentives and ownership
(Miles et al. 1997; Zenger 2002). Oticon’s measurement systems were not adequate to
undertake precise, fine-grained performance evaluation. Also,  the incentive effects of the
employee stock ownership program appear to have been limited.  Thus, remuneration schemes
may not have sufficiently high-powered to complement the widespread delegation of decision
rights in the organization, fostering, in turn, a need for monitoring and selective intervention on
the part of Kolind and the Products and Projects Committee that went beyond what would have
been necessary with better measures of employee performance, and which had the unintended
side-effect that motivation was seriously harmed.
                                                
35
 In contrast, some theorists argue that organizational elements are more malleable, and that the set of stable
discrete governance structures (i.e., clusters of organizational elements) is larger, than what is conventionally
assumed in much of organization theory and in the economics of organization (e.g., Grandori 2001; Helper,
MacDuffie and Sabel 2000).
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Thus, from this perspective, an important problem of not getting the complementarities right in
the design of radical internal hybrids is that it gives rise to selective intervention which is
intended to remedy problems (of coordination and moral hazard), but harms motivation.  This
suggests the following proposition:
Proposition 1:  Internal hybrids that violate patterns of complementarity characteristic of
this organizational form will be subject to more problems of selective intervention than
hybrid forms that get the complementarities right.
A corollary to this proposition is that advances in measurement methods will result in less
selective intervention, because the measurement of performance is improved so that the moral
hazard stemming from the delegation of rights is reduced.  This makes it easier to establish
viable internal hybrids.
Commitment Problems and Organizational Form
Although there may thus be more selective intervention in internal hybrid forms where patterns
of complementarity are violated, selective intervention may still take place even in well crafted
internal hybrids. Even if, for example, very fine-grained performance measurement systems that
complement strong delegation of decision rights may be implemented, the top management
team still possesses those ultimate decision rights that allow them to overrule subordinates.
Fundamentally, even very well-crafted attempts at infusing hierarchies with elements of market
control will always be merely a simulation of market exchange, because, unlike independent
agents in markets, corporate employees never possess ultimate decision rights.  They are not
full owners.  This reintroduces the problem of selective intervention, because those who possess
ultimate decision rights can always overrule subordinates.
However, the problem of selective intervention is not independent of organizational structure,
notably, the number of hierarchical layers in the organization, and therefore the distribution of
information and authority in a firm.  Arguably, organizations that adopt internal hybrids that
amount to drastically reducing the number of hierarchical layers, such as Oticon’s spaghetti
experiment, are particularly prone to this problem relative to more hierarchical firms.  There are
(at least) three reasons for this. 
First, decision rights are more solidly established in a traditional hierarchy, being associated
with well-defined, distinct positions, than in a flat, project-based organization, where decision
rights are much more fleeting. Organizational expectations that certain positions involve certain
decision rights are very well established, and potentially costly for a top-manager to break with
through selective intervention.  The same kind of organizational expectations are not likely to
be established in a flat, project-based organization.
Second, a top-manager who selectively intervenes in a hierarchical organization risk overruling
the whole managerial hierarchy (all those below him), whereas this may be a smaller a concern
in a flat organization, where the CEO may only harm motivation in a specific project if he
overrules that project.
Third, information processing perspectives (Thompson 1967; Galbraith 1974) suggest that the
hierarchy is not just a structure of authority, but also one of information. The informational
distance between projects and top-manager may be made large by having a multi-layered
hierarchy.  This implies that the top-manager knows that he is in key dimensions ignorant about
the project (Aghion and Tirole 1997).  In this case, his incentives to selectively intervene will
be small.  In the case of Oticon, commitment to non-intervention was established with the more
hierarchical structure that succeeded the spaghetti structure.  The preceding arguments suggest
the following proposition:
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Proposition 2: An internal hybrid form that is organized within a firm with few
hierarchical layers will be associated with larger efficiency losses caused by problems of
selective intervention than an internal hybrid form that is organized within a firm with
more hierarchical layers.
Clearly, an implication of this proposition is that more traditional types of internal hybrids, such
as some kinds of matrix organization and perhaps even the M-form structure, are likely to be
more stable than very radical internal hybrids that breaks down the hierarchy in an attempt to
emulate the market.  This is consistent with the Oticon experience.
Commitment Problems and the External Environment
In the case of the Oticon spaghetti organization, one of the reasons why the Products and
Projects Committee considered that selective intervention was necessary had to do with
impossibility (or high costs) of making detailed plans for future business development.  An
important reason why detailed planning (or detailed contracts) is difficult to undertake has to do
with the emergence of unforeseen contingencies (e.g., new technologies) that upset existing
plans (contracts).  The rather turbulent hearing-aids industry arguably was an environment in
which such contingencies occurred.  This fostered the need, from the perspective of the Oticon
management team, of intervening in projects in an attempt to adapt to new contingencies.  This
suggests a third proposition:
Proposition 3:  There will be more selective intervention in internal hybrid forms that
operate in turbulent industries than in internal hybrid forms that operate in tranquil
industries.
Analytically, this proposition may be taken to be the other side of the coin of the transaction
cost argument that external hybrids are unstable in “dynamic” industries (Williamson 1996),
because in such industries unexpected contingencies that may give rise to hold-ups are more
likely. Along similar lines, the theoretical argument underlying Proposition 3 is that in dynamic
industries, the implicit contract between teams/projects and management in internal hybrids is
likely to be relatively more incomplete than in more tranquil industries.  Therefore,
management is likely to engage in more selective intervention in an attempt to influence how
projects react to unexpected contingencies.
Internal and External Hybrids and Internal and External Markets
The problem of selective intervention casts a novel light over governance choices between
internal and external hybrids and internal and external Markets (Poppo 1994). These
organizational forms may be thought of as substitutes, as mentioned earlier.  For example, all
may be adopted in order to better exploit local knowledge (Cowen and Parker 1997), or to
strengthen incentives, because they (albeit to varying degrees) make agents residual claimants
to a higher degree than in traditional hierarchies. Thus, they would appear to be rather close
substitutes. However, such a conclusion overlooks that whereas internal hybrids/internal
markets may suffer from the problem of selective intervention, external hybrids/external
markets do not suffer from this problem (Day and Wendler 1998; Corts and Neher 1999).
Admittedly, external hybrids and markets may suffer from inefficiencies caused by hold-up
problems when specific assets are deployed.  These inefficiencies should be compared with the
inefficiencies caused by the problem of selective intervention in the choice between internal
and external hybrids.  However, creating competition between suppliers, investing in hostages,
having some tapered integration, etc. may strongly reduce the hold-up potential.
The point is that it is inherently harder to design the problem of selective intervention away, as
it were, since a solution cannot rely on market forces or court-enforceable contracts.  The
26
implication is that, on average, external markets and external hybrids are likely to have
incentive properties that are superior to those of internal markets and internal hybrids, so that
there will be (transaction and production) cost penalties associated with the use of the latter.
This results in the following proposition:
Proposition 4: Except for transactions with a very high level of asset specificity, for the
same kind of transactions those firms that choose external hybrids (markets) over internal
hybrids (markets) will demonstrate better cost performance than those who choose
internal hybrids (markets) over external hybrids (markets).
This reasoning may be seen as a variation of a familiar theme of transaction cost economics
(Williamson 1996), namely that vertical integration be considered the option of last resort.
What it adds is an elaboration of the incentive liabilities of internal organization that makes this
the case.
Managing Commitment to Not Selectively Intervene
While theory suggests that the problem of committing to not selectively intervene is a tough
one, we do seem to observe a substantial amount of delegation in real world firms.  This
indicates that it is possible to credibly commit to non-intervention.  There are two fundamental
methods that managers may use for this purpose. Both essentially tie the hands of a would-be
intervenor.
The first one is to commit oneself to being (rationally) ignorant.  Thus, a manager may choose
not to be informed about a number of critical dimensions in projects.   In very hierarchical
organizations this may be easy to accomplish because of the large informational distance
between top-management and projects.
A second approach proceeds by managers making it harmful to themselves to selectively
intervene. Open announcement of a non-intervention policy, making such policy recorded in
company documents, working to install it in corporate culture, etc. all go some way to meet this
aim, since it makes the possible clash between the communicated values and managerial
interventionist practice extremely sharp, and makes very obvious the break of the explicitly
stated psychological contract (Brockner et al. 1992). Managers may suffer substantial psychic
costs as a result of this. Commitment may be further strengthened by letting the manager take a
financial position in the company; this will also make him suffer in financial terms from his
own harmful selective intervention.
The Spaghetti Organization as a Modulation Between Stable Organizational Forms
Although organizational designers sometimes design organizational forms that break with a
logic of complementarity, the possibility exists that although such unstable forms incur
penalties in terms of static efficiency (i.e., economizing with transaction costs and costs of
production), they may sometimes yield benefits in terms of dynamic efficiency (i.e.,
innovativeness). Calls for “chaotic” organization (Peters 1992) often implicitly makes such
arguments. Organization design activities need to consider both type of efficiencies (Ghemawat
and Ricart i Costa 1993). An implication is that in an intertemporal perspective, choosing
“consistent” configurations of organizational elements may not necessarily maximize the value
of the firm.
An ingenious argument of this kind has been developed by Nickerson and Zenger (2000).  They
suggest that considerations of efficiency may dictate modulating between discrete
organizational forms (such as the old hierarchical Oticon organization and the post-spaghetti
matrix structure), even in response to a stable set of environmental conditions.  This is because
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the steady-state functionality delivered by a discrete organizational form may itself be discrete,
and the desired functionality may lie in between those delivered by the discrete organizational
forms. Efficiency gains may then be obtained by modulating between the forms.
If indeed the Oticon spaghetti organization may have incurred inefficiencies with respect to the
organization of its administrative systems, it is hard to dispute the proposition that it was also a
quite innovative organization (cf. Table 1).  These benefits may likely have overwhelmed the
organizational costs.36 Although the spaghetti organization was not stable in the presence of the
problem of selective intervention, it would still have made sense to choose this form, even if the
designers had known it to be inherently unstable.  In fact, much of the early discussion of the
spaghetti organization made reference to the need to try something entirely new and admittedly
chaotic, for the purpose of drastically shaking up the original, bureaucratic organization (Kolind
1990; Peters 1992; Poulsen 1993).  This is consistent with Nickerson and Zenger’s theory: The
Spaghetti organization may indeed be an example of modulating between the stable
organizational form of the traditional, pre-spaghetti hierarchy, and the stable matrix
organization post the spaghetti.  What lends credence to this interpretation is that although the
hearing aids industry was quite dynamic in the relevant period (Lotz 1998), it is not possible to
identify environmental changes that might have caused the organizational change away from
the spaghetti.
Firms and Markets 
Finally, the emphasis on the problem of committing to not selectively intervene casts light over
the classical issue of what are the fundamental differences between firms and markets. This
paper supports the original Coasian position that the difference is that markets do not rely on
resource-allocation by means of authority whereas firms do (Coase 1937).  “Authority” is a
problematic word because it is often invested with a too narrow meaning, for example, detailed
direction and supervision (Foss 2002).  However, authority also means the power to set th
boundary conditions for a relation, such as deciding that employees of our firm cannot also be
employees of another firm (Holmström 1999), or defining what is acceptable discourse within a
firm (Argyres and Mui 2000).  Ultimately, the meaning of having authority is that one can
restrict the decisions of one’s subordinate, overrule him, and perhaps fire him. This means that
although decision rights may be delegated, we can still trace the chain of authority in a firm,
and we will always realize that ultimate decision-making power resides at the top.  As this
paper has illustrated, all subordinates’ decision rights “are loaned, not owned” (Baker, Gibbons
and Murphy 1999: 56).  Fundamentally, it can never be otherwise.  This is because ultimate
decision-making rights can only be transferred from bosses to subordinates in one way, namely
by transferring ownership (Hart 1995).  However, transferring ownership amounts to spinning
off the person to whom ownership is given. It means creating a new firm.  It is this fundamental
difference in how ownership is allocated that underlies the problem of selective intervention.
The analysis in this paper thus makes direct contact with important modern theories (Hart 1995;
Williamson 1996; Baker, Gibbons and Murphy 2000) that stress the importance of ownership
for the understanding of the nature of firms and firm boundaries.
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 At least for some time. It may be noted that the retreat from the spaghetti organization began when the major
innovations of Oticon had been introduced, thus suggesting that organizational costs might have begun to
overwhelm gains in terms of dynamic efficiency.  The organization has not yet come up with something as radical
as the 1996 DigiFocus.  Most of the innovations in recent years have spin-offs of DigiFocus (cf. Table 1).
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Conclusions
To many firms, the adoption of hybrid organizational forms is increasingly seen as imperative.
Although extensive research exists on the subject of external hybrids, rather little theoretical
and empirical research has treated internal hybrids (excepting the rather extreme case of the M-
form).  This paper has examined a specific experiment with adopting and later strongly
modifying a radical internal hybrid in an attempt to identify some possible liabilities of the
adoption of such organizational forms.  In particular, the focus has been directed to the
managerial problem of credibly committing to a policy of refraining from selective
intervention. While a few organizational economics contributions has treated this and related
problems (Williamson 1996; Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy 1999, 2000), it has not been applied
to the understanding of internal hybrids and related design issues, that is, the main purpose of
this paper.
A number of testable propositions were formulated to capture the arguments.  In particular, the
argument was made that problems of selective intervention are particularly prevalent in
organizations that adopt radical internal hybrids.  In contrast, firms with more traditional
hierarchical structures better shield themselves from the problem of selective intervention.
Managers may commit to non-intervention by means of rationally choosing to be ignorant or by
making it harmful to themselves to selectively intervene.  Also, the environment in which the
firm is placed influences the incidence of problems of selective intervention, these being more
prevalent in dynamic than in tranquil environments.  Finally, the problem of selective
intervention is a prime candidate for understanding the incentive liabilities of hierarchies and
internal hybrids vis-a-vis markets or external hybrids.
On the level of research methodology, this paper has, hopefully, exemplified the interpretive
power of organizational economics.  Admittedly, however, organizational economics only tells
a part of the story. From an organizational economics perspective, the spaghetti organization
represented a matrix of rights and incentives that are helpful for understanding its liabilities,
and how these liabilities gave rise to certain organizational dynamics (i.e., the partial
abandonment of the spaghetti organization). However, it may indeed also be understood in
terms of an attempt to, for example, foster dynamic capabilities through imposing loose
coupling and structural ambiguity on an organization (Ravasi and Verona 2000), a perspective
that cannot directly be captured by an organizational economics perspectives.  Thus, the full
story of the Oticon spaghetti experiment requires that more than one perspective be considered.
Relatedly, the paper has suggested that organizational economics should consider to a fuller
extent psychological insights in motivation and in cognition.  While it is possible to tell limited
stories of managerial commitment, selective intervention and stifled incentives based only on
organizational economics, there is little reason to be so narrow. A vast literature on procedural
justice in organization, psychological contracts, and biased cognition exists, the insights of
which should be combined with the relative rigor of organizational economics in order to
further a fruitful understanding of the nature of problems of managerial commitment, including
problems of selective intervention (cf. also Miller 1992; Lindenberg 2000; Foss 2001).
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